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Chapter 1: Central American Refugees in Mexico 
 
For the past 70 years, Central Americans have moved to and through Mexico, either to settle in 
the country or to reach the United States. Specifically, most have come from El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras, also known as the Northern Triangle of Central America (NTCA).a 
These movements have been influenced by a range of factors, including both direct and structural 
violence, and shifts in economic, political, and social realities. In recent years, the factors driving 
individual decisions to migrate or flee have become more complex and intersectional. Unlike in 
previous decades, it is now increasingly difficult to separate out the different forces—such as gang 
or gender-based violence, discrimination, or lack of economic opportunity—that drive hundreds 
of thousands of Central Americans to leave their countries each year. 
 
Throughout the late twentieth century, millions of Central Americans fled their homes to seek 
refuge from civil wars, genocide, natural disasters, and unstable or oppressive governments. From 
1954 to 1996, Guatemala experienced Central America’s longest and most violent civil war, during 
which the insurgent left clashed with a series of military-backed governments. In the 1980s, leftist 
insurgency was on the rise in the Mayan highlands and the military government began destroying 
entire villages, murdering more than 200,000 people and displacing another 1.5 million. About 
200,000 of the displaced Guatemalans fled to Mexico, where they settled in informal refugee 
camps along the Mexico-Guatemala border.1 Some also continued on to the United States. 
According to the 2010 census, Guatemalans made up one of the United States’ largest foreign-
born populations, with an estimated 850,000 residents.2 
 
In the late twentieth century, both political and natural disasters took place across other parts of 
Central America. In 1980, authoritarianism and social unrest in El Salvador culminated in a bloody 
civil war that lasted 12 years and displaced one million people (one-fifth of the country’s 
population).3 While in 1988, 1.5 million Hondurans fled the devastation of Hurricane Mitch, which 
was the deadliest hurricane to hit the Western Hemisphere in more than 200 years.b Since then, 
Honduras also experienced the influx of 30,000 refugees from El Salvador’s civil war in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, a series of regime changes and coup d’états (most recently in 2009), an 
election that was perceived to be fraudulent in 2018, and dips in the price of major agricultural 
exports. 
 
Beginning in 2011, there were demographic changes in Central American migratory flows through 
Mexico. Particularly, there was a sharp increase in the numbers of women and children who were 
leaving Central America, both as part of families and as minors traveling alone. In 2014, the 
number of unaccompanied minors from the NTCA who were apprehended at the United States’ 
southern border peaked at 52,000.4 More recently, the number of families migrating from the 
NTCA has grown significantly, with family unit apprehensions and inadmissibles at the U.S. 
border reaching nearly 128,000 in 2018, up from around 86,700 the previous year.5  
 
Among the growing number of migrants are also Central Americans of minority sexual 
orientations and gender identities and others fleeing violence, discrimination, and social exclusion 
                                               
a In general, references to Central Americans in this report refer to citizens of the Northern Triangle countries (El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras). In some cases, as indicated, the report also refers to Venezuelan and Nicaraguan refugees. 
b Hurricane Mitch killed more than 11,000 people across the region. 
  2 
for a broad range of reasons.6 These individuals have increasingly sought refugee status in Mexico 
and asylum in the United States. In Mexico, refugee status applications from Central Americans 
have spiked since 2013, with 886 applications submitted that year and 11,808 applications 
submitted in 2018 (through September).7  
 
Economic Instability and Structural Violence 
 
Economic factors play a significant role in migration decisions. The NTCA is one of Latin 
America’s poorest regions, with 32.7 percent of Salvadorans, 59.3 percent of Guatemalans, and 
65.7 percent of Hondurans living below the national poverty lines in each country (defined as 
US$1.90 for all three NTCA countries), according to 2016 World Bank estimates.8 A lack of 
economic development and opportunity underlies the major crises that the NTCA’s nations have 
experienced, including the rise of gang membership and influence. Furthermore, tax revenues in 
the NTCA are among the lowest in the region, limiting the quality and reach of public services, 
and deepening inequality.9 
 
Figure 1 
Percent of Population Living Below National Poverty Line (2013-2017)10 
 
                  Source: World Bank Data 
 
Most economic migrants from the NTCA hope to reach the United States, given the wage 
differential. In the United States, the federal minimum wage is more than five times what a 
minimum-wage worker could earn in the NTCA. Additionally, state and city minimum wages vary 
widely, reaching up to US$15.00 per hour in certain cities such as Seattle. Despite a higher cost of 
living, these high wages are particularly attractive to migrants seeking to send remittances back to 
their home countries. 
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Figure 2 
Minimum Wage by Country11 
Country Minimum Wage 
Guatemala $1.34-1.47/hr 
El Salvador $1.25/hr 
Honduras $1.43/hr 
Mexico $0.55/hr 
United States $7.25-$15/hr 
       Source: Wage Indicator Data 
 
Gang Violence 
 
Over the last five decades, the NTCA’s economic and political instability created an environment 
that was ripe for a surge in violence, corruption, and crime. Today, gang violence, drug trafficking, 
and weak institutions make the region one of the world’s most insecure.12 In 2015, El Salvador 
was the world’s most violent country not at war, with an annual homicide rate of 103 per 100,000 
inhabitants.13 By 2018, that figure had dropped to 51 per 100,000 residents, which still places El 
Salvador as Latin America’s second most violent country (eclipsed in 2017 by Venezuela). In the 
same year, Honduras also had a high homicide rate of 40 per 100,000 people.14 These rates remain 
higher than neighboring countries in Central America or Mexico, which had a homicide rate of 
25.5 per 100,000.15  
 
Actors associated with transnational gangs such as MS-13 and Barrio 18 carry out much of the 
violence in Central America. These criminal groups were formed in the United States in the 1980s 
by Salvadoran refugees who fled the civil war and were systematically disenfranchised. Living in 
marginalized areas and often denied legal paperwork, some of these immigrants turned to gang 
activity as a survival strategy. Yet in 1996, the United States passed the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act as part of an effort to address growing crime rates. The 
Act hardened immigration laws, adding penalties for undocumented migrants who commit crimes 
or remain in the United States for certain periods of time, and allowing for their deportation.16 As 
a result, thousands of Central Americans were forced to return to their home countries, including 
hundreds of MS-13 and Barrio 18 gang members.17 Once back in Central America, the gang 
members regrouped and solidified their power, enabled by weak state institutions, corrupt law 
enforcement and political regimes, and a lack of economic opportunity across the region.  
 
Today, the gangs maintain a significant presence in the NTCA and continue to flourish. Violent 
crime, extortion, and kidnapping have become commonplace as local and federal governments fail 
to protect their citizens. A 2015 International Crisis Group report found that Salvadorans in poor, 
urban neighborhoods paid an estimated US$400 million in extortion fees annually to criminal 
actors, and Hondurans and Guatemalans paid US$200 million and US$60 million respectively.18 
These threats and violence drive migration. According to a 2017 report by Doctors Without 
Borders, 40 percent of surveyed Central American refugees in Mexico had left their country 
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because either they or their families had experienced direct violence or threats from criminal 
gangs.19  
 
Figure 3 
Surveyed Central Americans in Mexico - Migration Related to Direct Violence (2017)20 
 
Source: Doctors Without Borders Data 
  
Certain policy responses in Central American countries have exacerbated these conditions, 
particularly through hardline policies toward the gangs. For example, former President of El 
Salvador, Salvador Sánchez Céren, liberally expanded the permissible use of force in what came 
to be known as “iron fist” (mano dura) policies. Police were given latitude to perform extra-judicial 
executions of gang members, search and seizures, and joint operations with the military.21 Other 
NTCA countries have pursued similar hardline punitive policies to combat gang violence, 
including the Sweep-Up Plan in Guatemala and Zero Tolerance in Honduras, which codified 
tactics including mass incarceration and extrajudicial killings.22 Rhetorically, El Salvador and 
Honduras labelled MS-13 gang members as “terrorists.” These approaches not only failed to 
address underlying social and structural causes, but in some cases actually strengthened the 
criminal gangs by solidifying a common outcast identity and opposition to the government.23 
 
Sexual and Gender-Based Violence 
 
Women. The phenomena of increasing numbers of women fleeing Central America is in part 
linked to staggering rates of sexual and gender-based violence. In 2015, El Salvador and Honduras 
had some of the highest rates of femicide globally, ranking third and fifth in the world 
respectively.24 Other forms of violence against women are also common. A 2008 National Family 
Health Survey by the Salvadoran Demographic Association found more than one quarter of all 
women in El Salvador reported that they have been victims of sexual violence at the hands of an 
intimate partner, a number that would increase if it were to include male family members or 
acquaintances.25 A 2013 survey showed that approximately 30,000 women report sexual violence 
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each year in Honduras, with one woman reporting sexual violence approximately every three 
hours.26 In Guatemala, a 2015 study found that a new case of sexual violence was reported every 
46 minutes, and 64 percent of the victims were minors.27 In 2017, the Guatemalan Public Ministry 
received over 50,000 reports of violence against women and over 10,000 reports of sexual 
assault.28 All these figures represent a fraction of total instances, due to significant underreporting.  
 
According to a 2017 report by Kids in Need of Defense, women and girls from Central America 
reported in interviews that gang members use sexual and gender-based violence to intimidate and 
exercise control over communities, and are seldom held accountable.29 Some of the most common 
crimes include sexual assault and rape, domestic violence, human trafficking, and commercial 
sexual exploitation, as well as the sexual abuse of children.30 Teenage girls, often younger than 16 
years-old, are forced to become gang members’ “girlfriends,” and many experience sexual or other 
forms of violence, even murder, if they try to resist.31 Many victims of sexual crimes do not report 
them to authorities out of fear and a lack of faith in local justice processes, which in many cases 
have been co-opted by gangs. Oftentimes victims of sexual violence do not even report instances 
to loved ones, given a broad culture of blame and stigma.32  
 
Once women leave their homes, they are among the most vulnerable migrant populations and are 
at high risk of experiencing horrific violence similar to that which they are fleeing. In a Doctors 
Without Borders survey conducted in 2015 and 2016, nearly one-third of women in Mexican 
migrant shelters reported they had been sexually abused in transit.33 Along the migration route, 
women might also feel unable to seek recourse for crimes they experience given their irregular 
migratory status, and may be reluctant to halt their journey to file and follow-through on a 
complaint, given the desire to continue moving onward. In addition, given widespread corruption 
throughout Central America and Mexico, migrants and refugees have little trust in successful crime 
prosecution, and women may even fear that officials themselves will be the perpetrators of 
violence. 
 
LGBTI Refugees. Increasingly, members of minority sexual orientations and gender identities are 
migrating from the NTCA given cultural stigmas and high levels of abuse and discrimination by 
gangs, criminal groups, and government authorities. Within the LGBTI population, gay men and 
transgender women are particularly at risk, given a deeply ingrained and pervasive culture of 
hypermasculinity or machismo. This cultural stigma leads not only to discrimination, but often 
also to physical violence, extortion, and social and structural exclusion, making it difficult to 
secure stable, dignified work, education, and health services.34 
  
According to available statistics, the NTCA is among the most dangerous regions in the world for 
individuals of a LGBTI sexual orientation and gender identity.35 In Honduras, the NGO Lesbian 
Network of Cattrachas (Red Lésbica Cattrachas) collected 264 reports of murders of LGBTI 
individuals from 2009 to mid-2017.36 In Guatemala, 40 transgender people were killed in 2016 
alone, according to the NGO Transgender Europe.37 While in El Salvador, 28 attacks against 
LGBTI individuals, including three murders of transgender women, were recorded from January 
to September 2017.38 These statistics are almost certainly underreported by media, community 
members, and the victims themselves, in part due to fear and a lack of confidence in the justice 
system. This mistrust is rational. A 2014 survey by the Center for Research and Promotion of 
Human Rights in Central America (Centro de Investigación y Promoción para América Central 
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de Derechos Humanos, CIPAC) found that nearly 70 percent of Federal Police in El Salvador did 
not think LGBTI individuals have the same rights as other citizens under the law.39 
  
As LGBTI refugees flee from these contexts in Central America, they often seek clandestine routes 
to avoid detention, and are therefore at higher risk of becoming victims of violence and crime. 
Once in Mexico, LGBTI refugees are particularly vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence 
and discrimination. According to the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), 
two-thirds of LGBTI Central American refugees reported that they had been the victims of 
violence within Mexico.40 This violence occurs not only in transit, but also within shelters and 
particularly detention centers, where both women and LGBTI refugees may become victims of the 
same kinds of discrimination and violence that they are fleeing. 
 
Political and Social Conflict 
 
Finally, political instability and social conflict throughout Latin America has continued to shape 
the region’s migratory context. The Northern Triangle region has had an average score of 30 out 
of 100 for three consecutive years on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI)—zero being completely corrupt and 100 being free from corruption.41 Transparency 
International also highlights the connection between corruption and inequality, which feed one 
another in a vicious cycle as power and wealth become increasingly uneven within a country.42 
While income inequality has declined in Latin America, it is still the most unequal region in the 
world. According to Oxfam, in 2014 the richest 10 percent of Latin America’s population 
possessed 71 percent of the total wealth.43  
 
This trend has been coupled with unequal distribution of social and political power, and high-
profile abuses of that influence. In 2017, claims that fraudulent electoral activity had led to 
Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández’s reelection reignited unrest. Tensions had already 
simmered since President Hernández assumed power in 2009 through a military coup, and in 2015 
his party was caught in a social security embezzlement scandal.44 In response to the perceived 
electoral fraud in 2017, Hondurans took to the streets to protest Hernández’s legitimacy. Police 
and soldiers killed dozens of Hondurans participating in the democratic protests, which deepened 
tensions across the country.45 As people have lost confidence in the country’s political and social 
institutions, the urge to migrate has only increased.  
 
Political corruption extends across the region. In Guatemala, there have been a wide range of 
scandals, involving former President Otto Pérez Molina and current President Jimmy Morales. The 
UN-backed International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (Comisión Internacional 
contra la Impunidad en Guatemala, CICIG) uncovered these corruption schemes and has helped 
decrease impunity levels, from 95 percent impunity in 2009 to 72 percent in 2012.46c In El 
Salvador, following the end of the civil war in 1992, the National Civil Police (Policia Nacional 
Civil, PNC) was established to replace the highly corrupt National Police, Financial Police, and 
National Guard. While the PNC was created to restore democracy and peace in El Salvador, it has 
not fulfilled its mandate and has in fact become co-opted by criminal organizations, enabling their 
growing influence in the country.47 
 
                                               
c In late 2018, President Morales announced that the CICIG would be terminated in September 2019. 
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Notably, the number of refugees coming from Nicaragua and Venezuela is also on the rise due to 
political conflict and humanitarian crisis. In Nicaragua, violence and social unrest increased in 
2018 as the Daniel Ortega administration enacted sweeping economic changes to the country’s 
social security program that derailed the economy.48 Nicaraguans who speak out against the 
administration have been met with targeted violence from the government, causing many to flee. 
Data from the Mexican Commission for Refugee Assistance (Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a 
Refugiados, COMAR) indicates that in the first nine months of 2018, 566 Nicaraguans had applied 
for refugee status in Mexico, up more than 900 percent from the previous year.49 
 
In Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro's authoritarian regime has driven over three million people to flee 
the country since 2014, according to the UNHCR.50 Maduro’s 2018 reelection, broadly perceived 
both nationally and internationally as illegitimate, has deepened public distrust and unrest, and 
power outages and shortages of food, medicine, and other basic supplies have pushed the country 
into a severe humanitarian crisis. From January to September 2018, Venezuelans accounted for 25 
percent of all refugee status applications in Mexico (4,249 applicants)—nearly 19 times more than 
the number of Guatemalan applicants.51 
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Chapter 2: The Refugee Application Process 
 
Legislative Underpinnings 
 
The Mexican Constitution (Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos) forms the 
basis of the country’s migratory and refugee policy and guarantees protections for all individuals 
within Mexico. It also grants the federal government substantial discretionary authority to 
determine who can enter, stay, and pass through the country.52 Drawing on the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, a 2011 reform of the Mexican Constitution brought human rights to 
the forefront of Mexico’s legal order. Revised language throughout the Constitution guarantees 
human rights and dignity to all people, including foreigners in the country.53 
 
Alongside the constitutional reform, Mexico passed sweeping legislation that transformed the 
country’s migratory and refugee policy. The 2011 Law of Migration (Ley de Migración) cemented 
migrants’ rights and acknowledged Mexico’s role as a sending, transit, and receiving country. 
Passed the same year, the Law of Refugees, Complementary Protection, and Political Asylum (Ley 
de Refugiados, Protección Complementaria y Asilo Político, “Law of Refugees”) expanded the 
definition of a refugee under Mexican law, streamlined the application process, and bolstered 
refugees’ rights in Mexico.  
 
Both the Law of Migration and the Law of Refugees were accompanied by Implementing 
Frameworks that strengthened their provisions. The Law of Refugees and its Implementing 
Framework outline the 11 categories under which ‘well-founded fear’ (temor fundado) is defined 
with respect to refugee claims.54 These changes are based on international laws and treaties to 
which Mexico is a signatory member, namely the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, which justifies refugee status for those facing persecution. Mexico is also a signatory to 
the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, which outlines generalized violence and other 
macro-level conflicts as potential claims for asylum. These agreements helped lay the foundation 
for Mexico’s domestic policy, and a 1999 Supreme Court ruling established that international 
conventions take precedence over all other laws except the Constitution.  
 
Figure 4 
Grounds for Well-Founded Fear55 
Fraction I.  
Based on 1951 
Convention 
 (except gender) 
Fraction II.  
Based on 1984 Cartagena Declaration  
(legitimates gender as basis for claims) 
Fraction III.  
Relating to “sur 
place” refugees 
1. Race 
2. Religion 
3. Nationality 
4. Gender 
5. Social group 
6. Political opinion 
7. Generalized violence 
8. Foreign aggression 
9. Internal conflicts  
10. Massive human rights violations 
11. Other circumstances that have gravely 
disturbed the social order  
All of the previous 
may also apply to 
migrants outside of 
their home countries 
as conditions in that 
country change 
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Legal Process to Solicit Refugee Status 
 
Application for Refugee Status. The Law of Refugees creates a roadmap for migrants to obtain 
refugee status (see Appendix I). Once a migrant has entered the country, he or she may apply for 
refugee status at one of the four COMAR offices.d56 If a refugee status seeker is not in a city with 
a COMAR office, INM will accept the application and deliver it to COMAR for processing. By 
law, INM must also process refugee applications from anyone in its custody.57 INM must inform 
migrants of their right to seek refugee status and send any application to COMAR within 72 hours. 
They must also aid COMAR at each stage of the process (detailed below), up to the final step of 
notifying applicants of their cases’ resolutions.  
 
The principle of non-refoulement guarantees that INM will not deport an applicant while his or 
her case is pending.58 Both the Law of Migration and Law of Refugees specifically prohibit 
immigration authorities from returning a refugee to a country where his or her “life would be 
threatened or where there are reasonable grounds to believe that they would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”59 During the 
adjudication process, INM grants applicants a continued presence document known as a 
constancia, which is intended to prevent INM from pursuing deportation proceedings. Applicants 
are not allowed to leave the state where they file for refugee status. If they do, INM has the legal 
grounds to cancel their refugee application and deport them.60  
 
Adjudication Process for Refugee Status. Once the application is submitted, COMAR protection 
officers have 45 business days to make a decision on the case, with the option to file for an 
additional 45-business day extension if needed. Currently, filing this extension has become almost 
automatic. However, a September 2018 interview with an immigration lawyer based in Mexico 
City suggests that the timeline for processing refugee status applications is now closer to a year.61 
The combination of increased processing times and a restriction on freedom of movement deters 
some potential refugee status seekers from filing an application, and has been grounds for others 
to abandon their applications. 
 
Once COMAR receives an application, the first step is an intake interview, which determines 
whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution, as defined by the Implementing 
Framework for the Law of Refugees. Legally, COMAR must provide translation and interpretation 
services as needed during the intake interview to ensure the applicant’s complete and thorough 
understanding of his or her rights and the process.62 In 2018 (through September), there were 
nearly 200 applicants for refugee status from countries where Spanish is not the dominant 
language, and some indigenous Central Americans also have a limited ability to speak and 
understand Spanish.63 
 
There are certain categories of behavior that make an applicant ineligible for refugee status. These 
include 1) committing a crime against peace, genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, 
as defined by the international treaties ratified by Mexico, 2) committing, outside of national 
territory, a crime that is categorized as serious both in Mexico and the country where it was 
                                               
d The Law of Migration requires that individuals apply for refugee status within 30 days of entering Mexico. In March 2019, this 
30-day deadline—which could only be extended when the applicant demonstrated exceptional circumstances—was declared 
unconstitutional. Additionally, there is no fee to apply for refugee status. 
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committed, or 3) committing acts contrary to the ends and principles of the United Nations.64 Data 
acquired through a transparency request from COMAR’s Chiapas delegation cited reasons for 
refugee case resolutions and showed that only 42 individuals were denied refugee status because 
of “exclusion” between 2012 and 2018, which may include cases from these statutes.65 This 
represents less than 1 percent of the 16,739 cases included in the dataset. 
 
COMAR makes one of three official determinations on a refugee status application. If a refugee’s 
application is approved, then the refugee is granted permanent residency and a path to citizenship. 
Refugees also then have the right to request to be reunited with their families. If a claim is denied, 
the applicant is automatically considered for complementary protection, a status for individuals in 
need of international protection but who do not legally qualify to become refugees. 
Complementary protection grants the individual non-refoulement and permanent residency but 
does not grant the right to family reunification. Legally COMAR must also provide a clear and 
personalized written explanation for the denial, and the applicant remains eligible to appeal the 
resolution for up to 15 days after the final decision.  
 
Beyond these official determinations, COMAR has increasingly reported that applications are 
abandoned, withdrawn, or left pending without a resolution. An analysis of COMAR resolution 
data from the Tapachula, Chiapas office revealed that as the most common reason cited for 
abandoned cases was “inattention” (inasistencia), typically meaning failure to comply with the 
weekly check-in appointments that COMAR requires of refugee status applicants. This suggests 
that factors such as long wait times may influence some individuals to abandon their cases. Others 
may have decided to continue migrating north to other parts of Mexico or the United States. During 
the same time frame, the number of pending cases has also increased. By November 2018, more 
than two-thirds of all refugee status applications in Mexico were pending (see Appendix II). 
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Figure 5 
Applicants for Refugee Status by Processing Status (2013-2018)66 
 
Source: COMAR Data 
 
Those granted refugee status or complementary protection may apply for permanent resident cards 
upon the conclusion of their cases. Until last year, however, they could not obtain a personal 
identity number (Clave Única de Registro de Población, CURP) until they held this permanent 
residency card. The CURP is required for school enrollment, medical attention, employment, and 
other basic services, making it a crucial asset to facilitate integration into Mexican society.67 In 
June 2018, after pressure from several civil society groups that lobbied the National Public 
Register (Registro Nacional de Población, RENAPO), INM and COMAR began issuing 
temporary CURP numbers to refugee status applicants at the time of their application.68 This 
allows them to access basic services while their applications are being processed. A total of 4,995 
temporary CURPs were issued between June 20, 2018 and September 30, 2018, indicating the 
relatively quick adoption and implementation of this new program. 
 
Once an applicant has been recognized as a refugee, Mexican law outlines a process for facilitating 
his or her integration into Mexican society. The Implementing Framework for the Law of Refugees 
requires that COMAR develop and implement an integration assistance plan for each recognized 
refugee and provide corresponding follow-up services, although these terms are vague and there 
are no clear frameworks.69 Within COMAR, assistance officers are charged with this 
responsibility. Yet the overwhelming backlog of cases means that the agency’s primary focus has 
been on adjudicating new cases, and personnel and resources have not been dedicated to providing 
support to recognized refugees.  
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Mexico’s legal framework assumes a robust relationship between the government and civil society 
for providing refugee integration assistance. However, in practice, cooperation varies in its 
magnitude and nature. Nearly all refugee integration efforts in Mexico are currently carried out by 
civil society organizations—including legal support, job training, and healthcare—and do not 
receive government funding. The large workload and limited, inconsistent funding streams 
constrain civil society groups’ ability to provide the support that Mexican law guarantees to 
refugees, which is a federal responsibility. 
 
Demographics of Applicants and Refugees 
 
Overall, Central Americans submit more refugee status applications to COMAR than any other 
group. During the first three months of 2019, three out of every four applicants were from the 
Northern Triangle. Hondurans have increasingly submitted a larger percent of the applications. In 
2017, Hondurans submitted 29 percent of all refugee status applications, while during the first two 
months of 2019, that number had risen to 53 percent. According to Mark Manly, the UNHCR 
Representative in Mexico, these applicants are not all from the majority-Honduran migrant 
caravans.70 In fact, in 2018, less than 15 percent of refugee status applicants reported that they 
were part of a caravan. This trend has continued through February 2019, with less than 10 percent 
of applicants reporting to be part of a caravan at that time.71  
 
The number of Venezuelan and Nicaraguan applicants is also increasing. In 2013, there was only 
one Venezuelan applicant for refugee status in Mexico. By 2016, the number of applicants grew 
to 361, and then increased by over 1,000 percent to reach 4,038 in 2017. By the end of September 
2018, there had been 4,249 Venezuelan applicants over the year. From 2013 to 2015, less than 30 
Nicaraguans applied for refugee status each year in Mexico. Then between 2016 and September 
2018, the number of Nicaraguan applicants increased from 70 to 566, a more than 800 percent 
increase.  
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Figure 6 
Applicants for Refugee Status by Nationality (2013-2019)72 
 
           Source: COMAR Data 
 
Overall, minors are not highly represented among refugee status seekers in Mexico, nor among 
recognized refugees. Minors aged 14 years and under consistently account for approximately one 
in five refugee status applicants. However, unaccompanied minors—defined as children or 
adolescents under the age of 18 and travelling without a parent or legal guardian—apply in even 
lower numbers. From January 2015 to September 2018, only 1,279 applicants were 
unaccompanied minors, making up only 3 percent of total applicants. In the same time span, INM 
apprehended more than 50,000 unaccompanied minors across Mexico.73 
 
There are various reasons that minors do not apply for refugee recognition in Mexico. First, many 
minors’ ultimate goal is to reunite with family members in the United States. If these children 
receive refugee status in Mexico, they become ineligible to claim asylum in the United States, 
given they have already received protections in another foreign country. In addition, minors may 
not have sufficient information about the refugee application process and INM officials can 
exacerbate this issue if they fail to alert minors of possible protections. In 2016, a Human Rights 
Watch study found that INM had only informed 1 of 61 detained children about their right to seek 
refugee recognition.74  
 
Since 2013, COMAR has recognized approximately 13,000 applicants for refugee status or 
complementary protection. Over the past five years, there has been roughly equal number of 
recognized refugees from El Salvador, Honduras, and Venezuela, with about 4,000 refugees from 
each country. However, the application recognition rate varies significantly by nationality. In 
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2017, for example, only 27 percent of Honduran applicants were approved for refugee status or 
complementary protection, compared to 43 percent of Salvadorans and 28 percent of Guatemalans. 
These approval rates are lower than for other nationalities.75 For example, approximately 67 
percent of Venezuelan refugee status applicants were approved in 2017.e While more than half of 
Central Americans who received protections were approved for complementary protection (and 
not refugee status), all approved Venezuelans received refugee status, with none deferred to 
complementary protection. 
 
Figure 7 
Refugee Status Applicants and Approvals (Jan 2013-Sep 2018)76 
 
Source: COMAR Data 
 
 
 
  
                                               
e Unlike Central American applicants, Venezuelan refugee status claims are granted under the guidelines established in the 
Cartagena Declaration.  
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Chapter 3: The Role and Structure of COMAR 
 
The executive branch of Mexico's federal government is broadly responsible for all migratory and 
security policy. The Ministry of the Interior (Secretaría de Gobernación, SEGOB) determines 
procedural migratory policy, and COMAR is the agency within SEGOB that is responsible for 
processing refugee status claims and managing their cancelation or revocation. COMAR is also 
charged with providing social services to applicants while their claims are pending and assisting 
with recognized refugees’ social integration.  
 
Figure 8 
SEGOB Organizational Chart 
 
 
COMAR has three fully functional offices, located in Mexico City; Tapachula, Chiapas; and 
Acayucan, Veracruz; as well as a smaller delegation, or “representation,” in Tenosique, Tabasco.77 
All of these locations are in the southern half of the country, as seen in Figure 9. These locations 
aim to reach migrants crossing into Mexico at the southern border. However, the limited 
geographic reach hinders COMAR’s ability to attend to those traveling further north. Some 
migrants are not aware of their right to claim refugee status, while others decide to apply when 
they are closer to the northern border. 
 
As previously discussed, INM offices may accept applications for refugee status, which are then 
forwarded to COMAR. However, INM does not provide other forms of assistance—such as social 
services—that are available at COMAR offices. The limited number of COMAR offices also 
hinders the agency’s ability to conduct in-person eligibility interviews. Instead, the agency must 
rely on over-the-phone interviews, which are often less effective in garnering a complete picture 
of the refugee status seeker’s history, current situation, and particular needs. In collaboration with 
INM, COMAR seeks to gather background information and verify country conditions through 
databases.78 However, an applicant’s credibility is assessed primarily during the eligibility 
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interview, and judgments on the veracity of an applicant’s case are more reliable in-person.79 
 
Figure 9 
COMAR Offices 
 
 
Over the past six years, the number of people applying for refugee status with COMAR has 
increased exponentially. In 2013, 1,296 people submitted refugee status applications to COMAR. 
By the end of 2018, that number had climbed to 29,623, and during the first three months of 2019 
alone, the agency received applications from 12,716 people. The Chiapas office received 60 
percent of these applications, while Mexico City, Tenosique, and Acayucan, received 24 percent, 
10 percent, and 6 percent of applications, respectively.80 At the end of 2017, 53 percent of 
COMAR’s refugee status applications remained unresolved, and by the end of September 2018, 
that number had increased to about 86 percent. 
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Figure 10 
Applicants for Refugee Status (2013-2019)81 
 
Source: COMAR Data 
 
To address the growing refugee population, COMAR has limited personnel and the overall number 
of employees has not increased to meet rising demand for the agency’s services. Over the past few 
years, staffing numbers have remained largely consistent, with 52 official COMAR employees 
from 2013 to 2016 and a slight drop to 48 employees from 2017 to 2018.82 (A full organizational 
chart is available in Appendix III.) On October 1, 2016, SEGOB and the UNHCR signed a 
cooperation agreement to help alleviate these capacity issues.83 The agreement funded an 
additional 29 COMAR positions at a cost of more than MX$6 million a year (US$315,546) and 
also provided COMAR with technical support. These positions were spread across COMAR’s 
locations, with each office receiving at least five employees. Each office also received at least one 
official in each of the areas of assistance, protection, legal work, and psychology.84 (See Appendix 
IV for position chart broken down by type of job and office.) However, the increase has not been 
sufficient to address the increasing number of applications. In 2013, there was one employee for 
every 25 applicants. In 2017, despite the support from the UNHCR, that ratio grew to one 
employee for every 190 applicants.  
 
At the end of July 2018, the agreement between COMAR and the UNHCR expired and was not 
immediately renewed. Without an official agreement, COMAR can continue to hire UNHCR staff 
as contractors, but they are not authorized to conduct eligibility interviews with refugee status 
seekers or provide psychological, legal, or protective services. COMAR’s new general 
coordinator, Andrés Ramírez Silva, expressed hope that the two agencies would sign a new 
contract by April 2019, allowing SEGOB to make direct hires and expand its capacity.85 In a 
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February 2019 interview, Ramírez also noted that COMAR receives staffing assistance from other 
government agencies, such as INM.  
 
The UNHCR plays a vital role in refugee processing and integration in Mexico, and the two 
agencies have partnered on multiple fronts. The UNHCR has invited COMAR to participate in a 
“Participatory Assessment,” in which various refugee populations take part in a round-table 
discussion to better identify the challenges that they face.86 The two agencies are also working 
together to promote cooperation on shared challenges in Central America through the 
Comprehensive Regional Protection and Solutions Framework (Marco Integral Regional para la 
Protección y Soluciones, MIRPS).87 Additionally, they are moving forward on a new quality 
assurance initiative that involves a UNHCR official working within COMAR’s offices as a 
consultant to help accelerate eligibility procedures, increase organizational efficiency, and 
improve staff training and competency.88 COMAR’s new general coordinator is a former UNHCR 
official, suggesting that the two entities may work even more closely in the future.  
 
Personnel Analysis 
 
 On October 31, 2018, COMAR provided a personnel directory through a transparency request, 
which included detailed professional information for 42 of the agency’s 48 employees. The 
following subsection is an analysis of that information.   
 
Staffing at COMAR can be divided into six ascending tiers: entry-level positions, mid-level 
positions, heads of departments, area deputy directors, area directors, and a general coordinator.f 
As shown in Figure 11, COMAR employees are dispersed across the six tiers following a standard 
organizational structure. Mid-level employees constitute the majority of the staff and the number 
of personnel decreases proportionately with each higher tier.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
f The terms ‘entry-level’ and ‘mid-level’ have been translated from the Spanish ‘enlace’ and ‘enlace de alto nivel de 
responsabilidad.’ In the past, the term enlace was used to refer to someone working as a contract worker—that is to say, someone 
that was not considered an official employee of the agency. The term has since evolved to include certain employees, as is the 
case with COMAR. 
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Figure 11 
COMAR Staffing by Tier89 
 
                        Source: COMAR Data 
 
With the exception of two employees, everyone employed at COMAR has completed the 
coursework required to earn a bachelor’s degree (see Figure 12). However, in Mexico, students 
must either present a thesis paper or sit for a final exam before being fully conferred the degree 
and title of titulado.g During the period in which students have completed their coursework but 
have not yet been fully conferred the degree, they carry the title of pasante. More than 25 percent 
of COMAR employees that hold bachelor’s degrees are still considered pasantes. Additionally, 
four of the seven employees holding master’s degrees are considered pasantes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
g Additional steps in the process include registering with the National Registry of Professionals (Registro Nacional de 
Profesionistas) and obtaining an ID number (número de cédula). 
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Figure 12 
Highest Level of Education Completed by COMAR Employees90 
 
     Source: COMAR Data 
 
COMAR personnel overwhelmingly hold bachelor’s degrees in law (see Figure 13). Unlike the 
United States’ system in which law is only a graduate program, Mexican universities commonly 
offer legal studies at the undergraduate level. Four of the seven COMAR employees with master’s 
degrees are also focused in law. This high concentration of employees with education backgrounds 
in Mexican law speaks to the agency’s focus on refugee determination and protection work. The 
average COMAR employee has approximately nine years of work experience, with increasing 
years at each ascending work tier (see Appendix V).91 However, there is a broad range of work 
experience. For example, General Coordinator Andrés Ramírez Silva has over 28 years of 
experience in refugee work. 
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Figure 13 
COMAR Employees’ Bachelor’s Degree by Specialization92 
 
Source: COMAR Data 
 
Budget 
 
As with its personnel, COMAR’s budget has not increased in line with the growing number of 
applications. From 2013 to 2018, the number of applicants for refugee recognition in Mexico 
increased by more than 2,000 percent.93 Yet over the same period of time, COMAR’s budget 
increased by only 95 percent.94 For 2019, COMAR has been appropriated MX$20.8 million 
(US$1.1 million), down from MX$28.5 million (US$1.51 million) in 2018. To ensure that 
refugees’ needs are being met, the UNHCR introduced Plan Puente in 2019, a stopgap financial 
assistance program that allocates an additional MX$20 million (US$1.05 million) to COMAR, 
with the possibility of more funding later in the year.95 However, this piecemeal allocation leaves 
COMAR unsustainably reliant on the UNHCR for financial support and unable to plan efficiently. 
In February 2019, General Coordinator Ramírez Silva stated that securing a budget increase in the 
2020 budget appropriations is a top priority for the agency.96 
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Figure 14 
COMAR Budget vs. Applicants for Refugee Status97 
 
Source: COMAR Data 
 
Just as important as COMAR’s overall budget are the agency’s expenditures. From 2012 to 2018, 
COMAR spent the largest part of its budget on personnel, allocating 43.1 percent to this expense.98 
From 2012 through 2017, the agency spent less on support services such as translation and cultural 
activities—with less than 5 percent of its expenses falling into this category.h In COMAR’s initial 
2019 budget there was no money allocated toward these services. However, in previous years, 
COMAR ended up paying for translation services for non-Spanish refugee applicants, even when 
it was not part of the agency’s estimated budget. 
 
Overall, COMAR’s lack of budget transparency makes it difficult to draw any definitive 
conclusions. For example, one budget item that appears each year is “congresses and conventions.” 
However, the budget does not specify how many conferences were attended or when. In another 
case, more than MX$10 million (approximately one-third of that year’s budget) was listed only as 
“expenses related to cultural activities, sport activities, and extraordinary help.”i Without 
clarification, it remains unclear where exactly COMAR is allocating its budget.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
h In 2018, this percent jumped to 35 percent, due to an ambiguous budget item. 
i In Spanish, these expenses were listed as “gastos relacionados con actividades culturales, deportivas y de ayuda extraordinaria.” 
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Figure 15 
COMAR Budget Breakdown 2012-201899 
 
See Appendix VI for details on how categories are determined and yearly breakdowns 
Source: COMAR Data 
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Chapter 4: Guaranteed Rights for Refugees  
 
Introduction to Mexico’s Refugee Legal Framework 
 
Individuals in Mexico who are granted refugee status or complementary protection are entitled to 
certain legal rights and services from the Mexican government (see Appendix VII). These 
guarantees span both institutional and social rights, including things like family unity, 
employment, education, and health. The following tables of rights for each respective category are 
not meant to be exhaustive in nature, but rather outline some of the most important rights afforded 
to refugees. 
 
Documentation. Refugees are entitled to receive the following identification documents: a 
permanent resident card and a personal identity number (Clave Única de Registro de Población, 
CURP). Without this legal documentation, refugees cannot access basic public services or 
integrate into Mexican society.100 Refugees have the right to obtain identifying documentation 
from the Ministry of Foreign Relations and to receive help in obtaining documents through the 
consulates of their countries of origin.101 Although Mexican authorities must assist refugees in the 
process of acquiring documents from their country of origin, they must also respect refugees’ right 
not to solicit help from their previous residence.  
 
Figure 16 
Right to Identification Documents 
Relevant Law and Article Description 
 
Law of Refugees, Article 44, Section V 
Refugees are entitled to receive an identification 
document from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as 
well as documentation proving permanent residency. 
 
Law of Refugees, Article 57 
Mexican authorities must assist refugees in obtaining 
documentation through the consular services of their 
country of origin. 
 
Family Reunification After INM grants refugee status to an individual, the refugee may request 
to be reunified with his or her family.102 Although the law grants family reunification rights in 
conjunction with refugee status, refugees must wait for their permanent residency documents 
before petitioning for family members. Mexico designates as refugees all family members who 
come to Mexico via the family reunification process, and grants them permanent residency.103 Due 
to procedural delays, this process may take up to six months.104  
 
Mexico permits refugees to solicit reunification with the permanent resident’s mother or father. It 
also allows for reunification with the spouse, who is granted temporary residency for two years 
and can then obtain permanent residency if the marriage remains intact. These requirements are 
the same for common-law partners or equivalent figures. Children and siblings are also eligible 
for family reunification, provided that they are unmarried children and adolescents or are under 
the refugee’s legal representation.105 
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Figure 17 
Right to Reunification 
Relevant Law and Article Description 
Law of Refugees, Article 44, Section VI Refugees may request family reunification.j 
 
Implementing Legislation for Law of Refugees, 
Article 95 
Family members who enter Mexico through the 
family reunification process are legally considered 
refugees and receive permanent residency. 
 
Right to work. The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee established 
the legal precedent for refugees’ right to engage in wage-earning employment and receive the same 
social security benefits as nationals of a contracting state.106 As a signatory to the Convention, 
Mexico has also established through its Constitution and Law of Migration a legal mechanism that 
grants refugees the legal right to work, or the freedom to participate in any lawful activity without 
punishment.107 Article V and XXXIII of the Constitution and Article 44 of the Law of Migration 
entitle refugees the freedom to pursue a career or occupation of their choice. Similarly, the Law of 
Migration entitles refugees to receive a wage for the work they perform. As previously mentioned, 
refugees have the right to obtain legal documentation—such as a permanent resident card or 
CURP—that allows them to obtain employment.  
 
Figure 18 
Right to Work 
Relevant Law and Article Description 
Mexican Constitution, Article V & XXXIII Refugees are entitled to engage in the profession, 
industrial or commercial pursuit, or occupation of 
their choice  
 
Law of Refugees, Article 44, Section IV 
Refugees have the right to work and the freedom to 
participate in all legal activities without punishment. 
 
Law of Migration, Article 54 
Permanent residents may work in Mexico in 
exchange for remuneration, subject to an offer of 
employment. 
 
Education. The Mexican Constitution and Law of Migration set the foundation for all refugees in 
Mexico to access public and private education across the country. The educational rights conferred 
to refugees in Mexico are equal to those granted to Mexican citizens.108 Article 44 of the Law of 
Refugees requires that states revalidate foreign credentials and studies so that refugees can access 
educational services at the appropriate level for additional schooling, or pursue work opportunities 
for which they are trained.109  
 
 
 
 
                                               
j This right distinguishes refugee status from complementary protection, which does not confer this right. 
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Figure 19 
Right to Education 
Relevant Law and Article Description 
Mexican Constitution, Article III & XXXIII Refugees are entitled to free public education 
provided by the government.  
 
Law of Migration, Article 8 
Refugees have the right to access public and private 
education, independent of migratory status. 
 
Law of Refugees, Article 44, Section III 
The Mexican government must recognize previous 
studies and degrees earned by refugees, both those 
received in Mexico and abroad. 
 
 
Health services. As with the right to work and access education, the Constitution and the Law of 
Migration grant refugees the right to receive public and private health services.110 For refugee 
applicants, and everyone in the country regardless of migratory status, the Ministry of Health must 
provide free health services in emergency situations, including in cases of severe illness or 
injury.111 Legally, this guaranteed care includes both physical and mental health attention.  
 
Figure 20 
Right to Health Services 
Relevant Law and Article Description 
 
Mexican Constitution, Article IV 
Refugees are entitled to receive protection for their 
health from the government 
 
 
Law of Migration, Article 8 
Migrants have the right to receive public and private 
medical care. The Ministry of Health must provide 
free services to migrants in emergency situations, 
including in cases of severe illness or injury. 
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Chapter 5: Obstacles for Refugee Integration  
 
Mexico’s migratory laws outline a robust framework for refugee integration, but there are 
challenges with fulfilling the legal mandates. One primary challenge is a lack of institutional 
support for improving refugee integration at the federal, state, and municipal levels of government. 
In particular, financial resources and personnel have not kept pace with the increasing number of 
refugee applications, leaving COMAR without the capacity to fully address the current situation. 
To fill the gaps, civil society actors have stepped in, but their efforts cannot substitute for 
developing long-term institutional capacity. 
 
In addition to large-scale structural barriers, refugees face challenges in attempting to access 
employment, healthcare, and education. These challenges include but are not limited to low wages, 
informality, job market saturation, difficulty accessing financial institutions, burdensome 
bureaucracy, and a general lack of information about rights and procedures. This combination of 
challenges complicates refugees’ integration into Mexican society.  
 
Institutional Barriers to Refugee Integration  
 
While COMAR is the Mexican government agency charged with facilitating refugee integration, 
it faces multiple barriers in fulfilling its mandate. First, as previously discussed, COMAR’s 
budgetary and personnel constraints prevent the agency from effectively fulfilling its legal 
obligation to assist refugees with integration. Instead, the increasing number of refugee status 
applications has led the agency to spend its limited resources on application processing. Second, 
COMAR’s procedural guidelines for facilitating integration are not detailed in any federal 
legislation or implementing guidelines. Lacking clear guidance or specific mandates, COMAR 
often struggles to develop plans for improving legal, economic, and sociocultural services for 
refugee integration.  
 
Non-state actors have stepped in to provide resources for refugee integration, but these efforts 
often fall short. The UNHCR is the most prominent international organization that helps to 
integrate refugees in Mexico. In 2019, it anticipates that it will “help accommodate 10,000 people 
of concern, support 6,000 to access employment and 5,700 to receive legal assistance,” with those 
numbers covering both refugees and refugee status seekers.112 Other civil society actors, such as 
church groups, non-governmental organizations, and individual migrant shelters, also provide 
certain forms of relief to refugees. These civil society actors can help to fill short-term capacity 
gaps, but they often act on an ad hoc basis or in response to emergencies. They have relieved some 
immediate pressure on the Mexican government but cannot replace efforts to strengthen Mexico’s 
government institutions and long-term ability to assist refugees.  
 
Obstacles to Accessing Basic Services 
 
Beyond these institutional barriers, recognized refugees face a range of additional integration 
challenges when seeking access to employment, education, and healthcare. Many of these 
challenges stem from a lack of governmental support. For example, neither federal nor state 
governments provide any systematic program to support refugees seeking to enroll in schools, find 
housing and employment, open bank accounts, or meet other basic integration needs, as are found 
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in other countries.113 Non-governmental actors, such as the UNHCR, lead integration programs, 
but have limited scope. 
 
Employment. As noted previously, refugees are permanent residents under Mexican law and are 
granted certain forms of documentation and the right to work.114 However, refugees may find it 
difficult to obtain a secure job and achieve financial security. Some of the employment barriers 
are structural, with anecdotes indicating that employers may continue to require the obsolete FM3 
migration form for hiring purposes. (The FM3 form was once used to establish temporary 
residency but has been retired since August 2018 ).115 Other barriers may emerge from a lack of 
information about local job markets, with refugees relying heavily on personal networks or 
physical job postings advertised in public spaces like local markets.  
 
Oftentimes, these jobs are in the informal economy. In Mexico City, refugees frequently work in 
construction, masonry, and in the restaurant business as waiters or cooks, which can fluctuate 
seasonally or with changing economic conditions.116 In northern Mexico, particularly in border 
cities like Tijuana, refugees’ main employment opportunities are in industrial factories, or 
maquiladoras.117 These jobs do not always provide refugees with social benefits such as 
healthcare, social security, and disability or life insurance. Additionally, the positions may involve 
strenuous or even hazardous work conditions, such as in maquiladoras, where refugees have been 
exposed to chemicals within facilities that lack proper ventilation.118  
 
Refugees in these jobs also generally earn relatively low wages across the entire country. In 2019, 
Mexican President Andrés Manuel Lopéz Obrador’s administration raised the federal minimum 
wage by 16.2 percent to reach MX$103 (US$5.43) per day or US$0.68 an hour for an average 
eight hour work day.k119 In Mexico’s northern border states—where wages are higher than in any 
other region in the country—the minimum wage is MX$177 (US$9.33) per day.120 However, these 
increased wages remain lower than the minimum wages throughout NTCA countries, which 
average around MX$211.21 (US$11.20) a day.l Particularly for families with children or other 
dependents, these low wages may not be sufficient to cover basic services like food and housing, 
and can dissuade refugees from settling permanently in Mexico.   
 
There is also a mismatch between Mexico’s labor demands and the areas where most refugees 
live.121 While many employers throughout the country need labor, matching refugees to these open 
positions remains a challenge.m122 Currently, the UNHCR is leading Mexico’s efforts to improve 
relations and information sharing between the public and private sectors. The refugee organization 
has developed relationships with private companies over the last few years, mostly to raise 
awareness and counter commonly-held misconceptions about refugees. This informal outreach 
specifically aims to inform businesses that refugees have the legal right to work and are guaranteed 
access to employment.123 Anecdotally, parts of the private sector have since begun advertising jobs 
to refugees.124 
 
Since 2016, the UNHCR has also headed a relocation initiative in Mexico to better match refugees 
with available jobs.125 The program helps refugees in southern Mexico resettle in metropolitan 
                                               
k USD figured based on exchange rates from April 8, 2019. 
l See numbers from earlier in report. 
m Mexican officials’ estimate that there are 100,000 open jobs. 
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areas that have more employment opportunities and a greater capacity to absorb workers. The 
program’s first initiative launched in Saltillo, Coahuila, in collaboration with the local migrant 
shelter, Casa del Migrante. The program recently expanded to Guadalajara, Jalisco, in 
collaboration with the FM4 Paso Libre migrant shelter.126 The UNHCR keeps track of program 
participants and their integration into Mexican society by sending social workers on home visits.127 
 
Overall, the program has been a success. In 2017, a reported 92 percent of the 224 refugees enrolled 
in the Saltillo relocation program were working in full-time jobs, and saw their average weekly 
wages increase from around MX$900 (US$47.46) to MX$1500 (US$79.11).128 Similarly, 100 
percent of school-age children in the program were enrolled in school, compared to only 18 percent 
of children prior to their participation in the program.129 Yet the greatest indicator of the program’s 
success is that 86 percent of participants have remained in their new location, with 10 percent 
migrating to other cities in Mexico, and only 4 percent moving onward to the United States.130n 
The success of these programs may provide a model to be replicated on a larger scale.131 
 
Even if refugees are able to find employment, however, they often struggle to access their legal 
right to financial services. This may include difficulties such as opening a bank account to deposit 
income or applying for credit cards. Part of this challenge stems from the fact that banks may still 
request the now defunct FM1 and FM2 visas that were previously used to establish residency, 
simply because they have not yet updated their systems.132 While another part of the challenge 
comes from many refugees’ lack of knowledge regarding finances and financial institutions.133 To 
address this issue, the FM4 Paso Libre shelter in Guadalajara, in collaboration with the UNHCR, 
teaches refugees how to budget, manage savings, and provides other financial information. 
Overall, refugees’ limited access to financial systems makes them more vulnerable to theft, 
because they must deal exclusively with cash, and can complicate their ability to apply for credit 
lines. 
 
Education. The Mexican Constitution guarantees that all individuals within the country, regardless 
of migratory status, be able to access both public and private education services.134 The Law of 
Migration and the Law of Refugees reinforce these rights, and the latter also ensures that Mexican 
schools recognize coursework and credentials completed in another country.135 In October 2018, 
President Enrique Peña Nieto also mentioned these rights while announcing the migratory proposal 
“Plan Estás en Tu Casa,” although specific details about educational integration were not included 
in the announcement.136 
 
In practice, refugees face a number of obstacles when they attempt to access Mexico’s education 
system. The first step for refugee families is validating previous coursework in order to enroll their 
children into the appropriate grade. This step can be marked by burdensome administrative 
processes. For example, in Tapachula, Chiapas, refugee parents have reported difficulties 
validating their children’s foreign education credentials.137 As a result, some families have had to 
travel five hours to the Ministry of Education in Tuxtla Gutiérrez, the Chiapas state capital, for an 
official to override the administrative restrictions.138 For families facing economic hardship, or 
those with both parents working full time, traveling between cities to resolve administrative issues 
may not be feasible.  
                                               
n Those who do leave the program usually cite dissatisfaction with the industrial work, highlighting their familiarity and 
background in agriculture. Some also have social ties in other areas. 
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In response, civil society groups, such as Sin Fronteras, have organized campaigns to help refugees 
navigate the school enrollment process and reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies. The UNHCR has 
provided support to parents looking to enroll their children in school in Chiapas, and COMAR’s 
Mexico City office partners with local community organizations to provide support.139 On the 
administrative side, in 2015, the Institute for Women in Migration (El Instituto para las Mujeres 
en la Migración, IMUMI) successfully lobbied the Mexican Department of Education to eliminate 
the requirement that foreign education documents be notarized.140  
 
Despite this change in the law, schools still frequently reject foreign documents and have been 
slow to adjust to the new mandate.141 In particular, schools may request “constancias de origen” 
for adult refugees seeking to continue their education. Only consular officials can provide these 
documents, and consulates for Honduras and El Salvador at times have limited capacity given the 
numbers of Hondurans and Salvadorans seeking assistance in Mexico.142 To overcome this 
challenge, FM4 works with Mexico’s National Education Institute for Adults (Instituto Nacional 
de la Educación para los Adultos, INEA) to have schools recognize diplomas from other 
countries.143 
 
Once refugee children are enrolled in classes, they may face obstacles integrating into the 
classroom. The local, state, and federal Mexican school systems have been slow in developing 
strategies to actively orient and integrate students of varying cultural backgrounds, languages, 
socioeconomic status, and education levels. Part of the problem lies in the fact that there is little 
consensus on which level of government should be responsible for improving refugee children’s 
educational opportunities. National teacher education and professional development programs do 
not incorporate sensitization to particular student populations, including refugees, into their 
training.144 As a result, children in these populations may go unnoticed, and any particular 
academic or socioemotional needs may go unaddressed. In turn, these children sometimes face 
discrimination for their noticeably different accents.145 Discrimination from their peers can lead to 
both socioemotional and academic difficulties.146 
 
Healthcare. As previously mentioned, Mexican law guarantees access to healthcare for all people 
within the country, but refugees frequently struggle to access health services. Despite increasing 
numbers of refugees in Mexico, the Mexican government has not stepped up its commitment and 
capacity to confront this population’s healthcare needs. Of particular importance and concern is 
the high incidence of psychological trauma among refugees. Poor mental health conditions may 
stem from a host of different issues, including but not limited to experiences in refugees’ home 
countries, violent or traumatic events along the migration route, and the stress of adjusting to a 
new country and community, particularly where they may feel unwelcome, unsupported, and 
disconnected.  
 
The effects of this violence and stress are widespread, ranging from physical ailments to mental 
trauma. From 2015 to 2016, Doctors Without Borders treated 1,817 refugees and migrants across 
Mexico for mental health issues. Ninety-two percent had “lived through a violent event in their 
country of origin or during the route that threatens their mental health and wellbeing,” and nearly 
50 percent cited physical violence as the reason they sought mental attention.147 An additional one-
third of the treated population had symptoms associated with depression, and nearly 12 percent 
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showed symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).148  
 
These psychological conditions, even when detected, are not always appropriately addressed with 
counseling, medication, or other forms of care. Beyond the intake interview, COMAR does not 
have any mechanisms to detect refugees’ physical or mental health trauma. Although the Law of 
Refugees guarantees special protections to vulnerable populations, including victims of sexual and 
gender-based violence, there is no national system or program related to facilitating these 
protections.149 Additionally, for victims of domestic and gender-based violence, the persistent 
perception that these are “private matters” weakens these refugees’ ability to communicate, justify, 
and secure the support that they may require, such as counseling, medical attention, or relocation 
and protective services.150 To date, there have not been any systematic federal efforts to sensitize 
officials and the public to refugees’ legal rights and particular needs.  
 
Without proper treatment, trauma and similar psychological conditions can hamper refugees’ 
ability to integrate into Mexican society. In general, individuals affected with these psychiatric 
conditions often struggle to find and keep a stable job, pursue and succeed in educational 
opportunities, and develop social ties and networks of support in local communities.151 The 
challenge is magnified in the area of sexual health, largely due to discrimination and a lack of 
understanding of the needs of specific groups, such as sexual assault victims and LGBTI refugees. 
 
Discrimination and Ignorance 
 
Discrimination, misconceptions, and ignorance about refugees is common among Mexican 
government officials and citizens, and this complicates efforts to protect and integrate refugees. 
Discrimination based on ethnicity or gender identity is common in Mexico. Refugees experience 
social exclusion, especially due to their belonging to a particular social group, and may be 
retraumatized by some of the same factors that led them to flee their countries of origin. For 
refugees who have faced discrimination, violence or abuse, and others who are particularly 
vulnerable, the state guarantees institutional assistance and protection. Yet this promise is vague 
and difficult to fulfill. Instead, there are anecdotes of poor procedural implementation and cases of 
discrimination and abuse by officials, who are seldom held accountable.152  
 
Vulnerable and minority populations, such as members of the LGBTI community, face even 
greater barriers for integrating into Mexican society. Like Central America, Mexico has a strongly 
heteronormative culture. Stigma toward individuals with alternative sexual orientations or gender 
identities prevails in many parts of the country, particularly in religious communities. The LGBTI 
population faces discrimination in various contexts, including from employers, landlords, and 
fellow refugees, who may hold the same social biases that the refugees confronted in their home 
communities. As a result, they struggle to break into the social networks that other refugees 
develop to find work, navigate public systems, and integrate socially into their communities.153 
 
Furthermore, refugees’ own misunderstandings and lack of knowledge sometimes prevent them 
from defending their rights or pursuing access to social services in Mexico. Refugees’ 
unfamiliarity with Mexico’s legal protections under the Constitution, Law of Migration, and Law 
of Refugees means that many do not know their legally mandated social rights or guaranteed 
government support. However, even if refugees were better informed, widespread fear and mistrust 
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of Mexico’s legal and justice systems may impede them from pursuing or advocating for their 
rights. Additionally, normalization of violent and traumatic events both in countries of origin and 
within Mexico may make refugees unaware or unable to express what they survived, and any 
special needs they may have for care, support, or protection. 
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Chapter 6: Policy Responses 
 
From 2013 to 2018, COMAR reported that 13,363 individuals from Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Venezuela were recognized with refugee status and complementary 
protection. This small but growing refugee community is dispersed throughout Mexico, 
particularly in the country’s southern and northern border states, and in large cities such as 
Guadalajara and Mexico City. While refugees are guaranteed legal rights to education, 
employment, healthcare, and institutional support in Mexico, they face significant challenges in 
accessing these rights. 
 
To address these challenges, Mexico’s federal government should assume its legal responsibility 
to better protect and support refugees throughout the country. However, local and state 
governments, as well as private actors, can also play a supportive role in refugees’ transition and 
integration into society, helping them to become healthy, stable, and productive community 
members. By designing policies and revamping services for refugees, the Mexican government 
would not only fulfill its legal commitments, but also foster long-term cultural and economic 
benefits.  
 
1. Expand COMAR’s Operational Capacity and Address Staffing Concerns 
 
Increase COMAR’s budget. Over the past six years, COMAR’s fiscal appropriations have not 
kept pace with the number of refugee applications. From 2013 to 2018, the number of refugee 
applicants increased over 2,000 percent, while the budget increased by only 95 percent. As a result, 
the agency has been unable to meet the deadlines required by law, such as the 45 business day 
turnaround on application decisions. If COMAR is to fulfill its mandate, it must begin to receive 
a budget that is commensurate with its workload.  
 
● COMAR should receive a budget of MX$119.2 million (US$6.3 million), which is 472 
percent more than it currently receives. The following methodology was used as a starting 
point to reach this number: In 2016, COMAR had a budget of MX$22.3 million (US$1.17 
million) and successfully processed applications for 8,784 people, closing out the year with 
only four pending cases. This means that COMAR spent an average of MX$2,537 
(US$134.54) per applicant. The agency is projecting 47,000 people will apply in 2019. 
With 2016’s success as a benchmark, and accounting for the MX$20 million (US$1.06 
million) provided by UNHCR and the MX$20.8 million (US$1.1 million) already 
appropriated by the government, COMAR should receive an additional MX$78.4 million 
(US$4.15 million) for its protection operations in 2019.  
● In 2020, to help establish the Monterrey office mentioned below, COMAR should receive 
a one-time appropriation increase to cover the start-up costs for establishing the office.  
 
Improve Fiscal Transparency. COMAR should publish more transparent budget data. With the 
current nebulous budget data, it is difficult to determine whether or not COMAR spends money 
effectively. This concern will only increase if the refugee agency receives a larger budget.  
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● COMAR should publish budgetary data that provides greater specificity to the listed 
expenses. For example, the expense that says “Contracting of other services” should 
provide subsections or line items outlining the contracted services.  
● COMAR should allocate money for service activities every year, rather than doing so 
sporadically. Items such as “Printing and promotion of informative material” will recur 
every year, and the budget should reflect that.  
● To ensure that money is being allocated appropriately, COMAR should undergo a financial 
audit conducted by an independent third-party company. This would serve as an impartial 
supplement to the reviews performed by the Auditoría Superior de la Federación, 
Mexico’s governmental organization dedicated to internal audits.  
 
Increase COMAR’s geographic scope. In addition to investing in new technology and staff, 
COMAR should expand its geographic scope. As previously discussed, individuals are not always 
aware of their right to seek refugee status when they enter the country and others may not decide 
to submit an application until they are in the northern part of the country. However, once refugee 
status seekers reach these northern states, there are no COMAR offices. This limits refugee status 
seekers’ ability to access the full range of refugee services available to them further south. 
 
● Northern Office. An initial expansion should include a delegation in the city of Monterrey, 
Nuevo León. This city leads Mexico’s northern region in refugee applications submitted 
through INM, accounting for 45 percent of all refugee status applications from this region 
in 2018.154 It should start out as a smaller office, similar to the delegation in Tenosique, 
Tabasco. 
● Port of Entry Outreach Team. The COMAR delegation in Chiapas should send an 
outreach team to the point of entry in Ciudad Hidalgo. Ciudad Hidalgo is the main crossing 
point on the international border with Guatemala. Sending a small team of employees to 
this border crossing area could help the agency to make contact with more refugees as they 
cross into Mexico. This team would be charged with informing migrants of their right to 
seek refugee status and providing them with information on the COMAR office in 
Tapachula.  
 
Improve assistance services. Chapter IV of the Law of Refugees charges the government with 
facilitating refugees’ integration into the country. COMAR assistance officers hold this 
responsibility and perform key functions to ensure that refugees have the tools they need to 
integrate into Mexican society, including facilitating access to healthcare and housing, providing 
information on their rights, and helping to report crimes.155 However, given the high numbers of 
refugee status applications, COMAR has had to prioritize adjudicating applications over providing 
refugee assistance. As of October 31, 2018, only 4 of the 48 COMAR employees were assigned to 
the assistance field.156 To ensure that refugees are given the opportunity to become self-sufficient 
members of Mexican society, COMAR should improve its assistance actions. 
 
● In addition to the director and upper-management positions, each COMAR office should 
be staffed with assistance officers and a department supervisor (jefe de departamento de 
asistencia).  
● While application processing should remain the agency’s priority, COMAR should make 
efforts to dedicate resources to the area of assistance. Allocating funds for these services 
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should be seen as making an investment in Mexico’s future. 
● Priority should be given to the Chiapas office, where 60 percent of applications are 
currently being received, and where access to civil society support is more limited than in 
Mexico City.  
● COMAR should take advantage of UNHCR’s expertise in the area of refugee integration 
and coordinate to fill any gaps in its services.  
 
Improve employee training and better facilitate self-care. COMAR lacks sufficient support for 
its employees. This report’s researchers interviewed three COMAR officers with a combined eight 
years of experience. Their employment spanned from 2013 to 2017 and included both protection 
and assistance work in the Chiapas and Mexico City offices. Each COMAR officer emphasized 
that support from COMAR was inadequate. Initial training sessions were limited and often focused 
solely on legal issues, leaving new hires alone to navigate the actual practice of protection and 
assistance work. This includes learning how to cope with secondary trauma and managing self-
care. Access to prescribed vacation time was also restricted. Despite having earned paid time-off, 
the former employees complained of having to negotiate to take vacations. In the cases when time-
off requests were approved, employees had to work extra hours before and after their vacation in 
order to make up the work. This resulted in high levels of employee burnout and turnover. 
 
● COMAR should develop a rigorous orientation and training schedule that incorporates all 
aspects of the job and not just law. This should include elements of case management, 
interview skills, and trauma-informed care.   
● Training should be an ongoing process that helps address both the agency and the staff’s 
needs. COMAR should arrange monthly trainings and seek input from employees as to the 
trainings’ content and purpose. These could range from human trafficking seminars to 
Excel workshops. 
● The agency should honor vacation requests when sufficient time has been accrued. This 
would result in a more productive and engaged staff and strengthen employee retention. 
● Other self-care initiatives, such as stress-relieving activities and mental health workshops, 
should be implemented to help employees cope with secondary trauma. 
 
Decrease administrative burden on refugee status applicants. Refugee status applicants have 
limited freedom of movement during the application process and must wait for a decision in the 
state where they applied. Given current backlogs, applicants may wait up to one year to receive a 
determination. Meanwhile, most refugee status applicants are waiting in Mexico’s southern border 
states, which is the most economically depressed region in Mexico. Additionally, current 
application procedures require that applicants physically sign in at their designated COMAR office 
once a week during typical working hours. Wait times to check-in are often a few hours, which 
places a burden on applicants who are seeking steady employment or are already working.   
 
● COMAR should provide applicants more freedom of movement during the adjudication of 
their cases by allowing them to easily transfer their cases between states. In states that do 
not have a COMAR office, applicants should be able to check in at INM offices.  
● COMAR should allow employed applicants to check-in outside of typical working hours, 
which could be accomplished by extending office hours on a particular day of the week. 
This would help to ensure that individuals are not having to risk their jobs in order to fulfill 
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the reporting requirement.  
● COMAR should make the check-in requirement less frequent. Allowing applicants to 
check-in once every two weeks, as opposed to weekly, would help to reduce the 
administrative burden placed on refugee status seekers while still providing COMAR with 
the assurance that applications have not been abandoned.   
 
2. Expand and Improve Integration and Support Services 
 
Recognized refugees continue to face obstacles in accessing their rights, social services, and other 
forms of support. To improve refugee integration requires concerted efforts across federal, state, 
and local governments to increase access to health and education services and employment 
initiatives. Part of the improvements will need to come from increasing budgetary and 
administrative capacity, and the other part will need to come through additional initiatives for 
specific refugee populations, including sexual and ethnic minorities, school children, victims of 
sexual violence, and those suffering from mental health conditions. In addition, there should be 
accountability and enforcement mechanisms to ensure that refugees can access legally mandated 
services and forms of support.  
 
Create Identifiable Integration Metrics. Currently, there are no official metrics for evaluating 
refugee integration in Mexico. To improve support for refugees, COMAR, the Office of Human 
Rights, Population, and Migration in SEGOB, and the UNHCR should work together to develop 
metrics for measuring refugees’ integration into Mexican society. This information would allow 
for more targeted programs and would help prevent inefficient resource allocation. There are 
international examples that these organizations could look toward. For example, Central European 
governments, in collaboration with the UNHCR, developed a tool to holistically evaluate all legal, 
socio-economic, cultural, and educational aspects of refugees’ lives. This evaluation aims to 
identify the strengths and weaknesses of various refugee integration policies. The assessment tool 
will become operational in the next 18 months.  
 
● COMAR and the Office of Human Rights, Population, and Migration within SEGOB 
should work with the UNHCR to develop a tool to evaluate refugee integration into 
Mexican society. 
● Project collaborators should develop indicators for measuring refugee integration across 
different areas, such as employment, education, and housing. These indicators would allow 
authorities to determine the areas in need of attention and improvement.  
● In developing the tool, the project collaborators should seek input from local and state 
governments and civil society actors—such as migrant shelters and religious groups—to 
tailor indicators to local conditions. 
● The data collection can be modeled on the UNHCR’s current home visits in Saltillo and 
Guadalajara, which evaluate the effectiveness of the refugee resettlement programs through 
personal interviews. 
  
Increasing cooperation between federal, state, and municipal governments. Authorities across 
different levels of Mexico’s government may not always regularly communicate with one another 
regarding refugee issues. By increasing cooperation among various levels of government, 
particularly with regards to refugee integration programs, authorities can identify best practices 
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and prevent repeating similar mistakes.  
 
● The Office of Human Rights, Population, and Migration within SEGOB should create a 
platform for national dialogue on refugee integration that includes representation from all 
levels of the Mexican government, civil society organizations, and the private sector. The 
platform may need to start small, such as with a national public forum, and grow over time. 
Officials in charge of migration issues for their state or municipality could attend and report 
back findings to be implemented in their area of responsibility. This platform would allow 
participating parties to align objectives, measures, and information to create more coherent 
integration policies.  
● SEGOB should provide funding to the respective State Commissions for Human Rights 
(Comisiones Estatales de los Derechos Humanos, CEDH) for states with sizable refugee 
populations in order to publish studies that highlight how refugees impact labor, health 
services, housing, education, and other parts of society in their geographic area. These 
studies can help provide information regarding how refugee populations contribute to cities 
and identify where further support may be necessary.  
 
Employment 
 
Some refugees arrive in Mexico with little or no formal education or job training. As a result, it 
may be difficult to find well paying, formal employment to support themselves and their families. 
In conjunction with current relocation and integration programs—such as the UNHCR’s initiatives 
in Saltillo and Guadalajara—there are a series of steps that government officials and non-
government organizations could take to connect refugees with labor markets and job training 
opportunities. The following recommendations aim to improve job training programs and market 
information for refugees.  
 
Expanding job training programs, with an emphasis on vocational training. Vocational training 
programs provide refugees with an entry point into the labor market. In November 2018, the 
Scalabrini International Migration Network inaugurated vocational training centers for migrants 
and refugee seekers in Guadalajara and Mexico City. In light of this effort: 
 
● The Ministry of Labor, in consultation with civil society organizations, should evaluate the 
two recent training programs and develop plans for expanding vocational training to other 
migrant shelters. Programs should collect and report data on outcomes, which would be 
used in refining and updating future refugee-focused programs. 
● The Ministry of Labor, in consultation with civil society organizations, should also form 
partnerships with private sector representatives, to explore opportunities for apprenticeship 
programs and job placements. 
● Civil society organizations and inter-governmental organizations, such as the UNHCR, 
should coordinate with the Ministry of Labor to identify LGBTI-friendly workplaces for 
refugees. This should also include input from LGBTI advocacy and research groups. These 
actors should also develop sensitization training curriculum to help make Mexican 
workplaces more welcoming for all employees regardless of their background or sexual 
orientation / gender identity.  
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Strengthen job market information. Over the past few years, state governments and non-
governmental organizations have worked together to improve refugees’ job prospects. For 
example, in November 2018, the government of Baja California advertised more than 20,000 
vacancies to migrants at the Ciudad Deportiva temporary shelter through a Job Fair in Tijuana. 
State authorities offered bus transport from the shelter to the venue. While it is too soon to know 
the job fair’s long-term impact, it is likely that some migrants found employment and were 
persuaded to seek permanent status in Mexico. Other state governments should follow suit and 
take additional steps to improve employment information for refugees.  
 
● Civil society organizations and the Office of Human Rights, Population, and Migration in 
SEGOB should collaborate with the private sector to conduct analyses that identify key 
industries, sectors, and geographic areas with labor market absorption potential. This might 
include sparsely populated, economically productive northern states that border the United 
States, such as Nuevo León, Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Sonora. 
● State and local authorities should draw on the best practices from the Tijuana Job Fair to 
create mechanisms for disseminating job market information to refugees. A comprehensive 
approach might include web portals, social media pages, phone applications, and local job 
fairs with subsidized or free transportation.  
 
Education 
 
Mexican law grants refugees the right to receive an education, but refugees often face challenges 
in accessing education services. Integration into schools, outdated systems for school 
administrators, and difficulties recognizing previous coursework all need to be improved or 
remedied for refugees attempting to integrate into Mexican society and access employment 
opportunities.  
 
Provide administrative actors at the local level with more tools to alleviate bureaucratic barriers 
for refugees. The Ministry of Education should take the lead on addressing refugee integration 
challenges in Mexican schools. The Ministry could do this by granting administrators and faculty 
at the local level more information, training, and autonomy to help facilitate an understanding of 
refugees’ legal rights and assist in refugee integration.  
 
● The Ministry of Education should disseminate standardized information to ensure local 
school administrators and directors in cities with high concentration of refugees like 
Mexico City and Guadalajara are aware of refugee rights and administrative procedures. 
This may include issuing a mandatory training workshop for school administrators, faculty, 
and staff to ensure comprehensive understanding of refugee’s legal rights and Mexico’s 
overall refugee context.  
● Ensure school administrators uphold and enforce the revalidation process of previous 
academic studies, credentials, and degrees from their country of origin in a reasonable time 
period after a refugee has submitted a request for revalidation. In order to ease this process, 
the Ministry of Education should grant local school administrators the authority to override 
restrictions at the local school level instead of the Ministry of Education offices.  
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Facilitate classroom integration. Refugees face challenges assimilating into schools and 
classrooms due to a range of barriers. The Ministry of Education should take specific steps to help 
primary, secondary, and high school administrators to ensure that refugee children receive 
adequate resources and support. Some of these steps would also benefit deported Mexican children 
who grew up in the United States and face similar integration challenges in Mexican schools.  
 
● The Ministry of Education should coordinate with COMAR and the UNHCR to create an 
orientation program for refugee children to ease their transition into Mexican culture and 
society. The program should include a cultural introduction to Mexico, familiarize them 
with academic curriculum, and facilitate a family orientation for parents of refugee 
children.  
● The Ministry of Education should require that teachers who have direct contact with 
refugee populations undergo professional development workshops in order to understand 
the socio-political environment for refugees in Mexico. This would help them be better 
prepared to address refugees’ diversity and any challenges that emerge inside the 
classroom. 
● The Ministry of Education should incorporate cross-culture studies into the academic 
curriculum to increase awareness and understanding of diverse cultures amongst teachers 
and students. This would help to combat discrimination against refugees in schools. These 
studies should include a focus on displacement and migration histories that are specific to 
Latin America and accurately challenge biases about refugees.  
● The Ministry of Education and COMAR should provide benchmark exams on critical 
subject areas such as mathematics, reading, and writing in order to more efficiently 
evaluate and identify refugee students’ education levels to help them better succeed in the 
classroom. Refugee students should also have the opportunity to receive remedial 
education and tutoring to advance their confidence and ability to academically flourish.  
 
Healthcare 
 
Refugees often face conditions in their countries of origin and in their transit to and through 
Mexico that take a significant toll on their physical and mental health. Despite the Mexican 
Constitution and Law of Migration outlining refugees’ right to receive healthcare, the population 
often faces challenges in accessing these services due to insufficient programs to meet their 
specific needs. The Ministry of Health and state-level actors under the National Health System 
should increase their financial resources and better allocate personnel to ensure that refugees live 
healthy lives in Mexico.  
 
Address administrative inefficiencies. A lack of accountability mechanisms, intergovernmental 
cooperation, and insufficient information regarding refugees’ legal rights and challenges impede 
the population’s access to targeted healthcare services. The Ministry of Health, in coordination 
with state-level healthcare administrators across Mexico, can help alleviate these challenges. 
 
● The Ministry of Health should disseminate information on refugees’ rights to improve 
awareness among healthcare providers. In addition, the Ministry of Health should offer 
workshops to train state healthcare professionals that work closely with refugee and 
migrant populations. This training would aim to reduce discrimination and highlight these 
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populations’ specific needs. 
● The Ministry of Health at the state-level should conduct semi-annual audits of public 
healthcare facilities to ensure the healthcare providers and facilities are up to date and 
operating in accordance with Mexican law to allow fair and equal access to healthcare 
services for all populations, including refugees. 
 
Address mental health. Refugees’ psychological conditions, even when detected, are not always 
appropriately addressed through counseling, medication, or other forms of care. Diversifying the 
types of healthcare services available in the Seguro Popular to refugees, especially for mental 
health, would be a significant step in improving their access to healthcare. The Ministry of Health 
and healthcare providers at the state-level should prioritize strengthening mental health screening 
and support for refugees. In order to ensure that these unaddressed issues do not have consequences 
on refugees’ integration, the Ministry of Health should strengthen mental health services.  
 
● The Ministry of Health should coordinate with COMAR to provide initial case detection 
strategies such as counseling and psychological consultations on an ongoing basis during 
and post-processing for refugees. This initial screening could take place at COMAR and 
INM offices in order to detect mental health conditions, document patients’ trauma 
histories, and collect any relevant details to integrate into specialized care for affected 
individuals. 
● The Ministry of Health should also provide health screenings and care at COMAR and 
INM offices for victims of sexual and gender-based violence, especially women and 
LGBTI individuals. These groups could also receive safety strategies, such as tips for 
contacting support hotlines, safety information, and emergency services numbers in 
Mexico.  
● The Ministry of Health should increase staffing of specialized healthcare professionals, 
especially psychologists, to provide psychiatric and behavioral medicine services in areas 
with large refugee populations.  
  
3. Reduce Discrimination Through Research, Sensitization, and Engagement 
 
Systematically study public perception and information on refugees. Mexican citizens and 
authorities are often unaware of refugees’ rights, why they might seek international protection, 
and the challenges that they face while integrating into Mexican society. Part of the challenge is 
that there has been little research completed on the topic and the research that exists may not 
always be recent. For example, the UNHCR published the most recent in-depth report on the 
topic in 2012.157 More recent studies of Mexican public opinion do not distinguish refugees from 
the general migrant population.158 
 
● In coordination with the UNHCR and Mexican civil society groups, COMAR and the 
Office of Human Rights, Population, and Migration in SEGOB should conduct a 
systematic study of public opinion toward refugees. It should include questions that tease 
out Mexican’s understanding of refugees’ specific challenges, both among officials and 
the general public. 
● This information should be published and distributed via email and/or printed materials to 
inform the Office of Human Rights, Population, and Migration, INM, COMAR, and 
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other public or private actors. It should be used to guide information and sensitization 
campaigns to combat xenophobia and discriminatory acts against refugees. 
● SEGOB should also examine knowledge gaps among INM and COMAR officials that 
may be contributing to inefficient or inadequate services for refugees, which could be 
then addressed through targeted trainings. 
  
Raise public awareness and sensitization about refugees. Refugees often face misperceptions 
and stereotypes, including about their races, nationalities, languages spoken, gender identities, 
social groups, or the conditions within their home countries. As a result, refugees may face 
consistent discrimination within Mexico that inhibits their ability to integrate into Mexican 
society. 
 
● The Ministry of Culture (Secretaría de Cultura) should collaborate with cultural 
institutions to produce informational exhibits on Central America and the treatment of 
refugees in Mexico. The Ministry of Culture should prioritize cities with COMAR 
delegations—for example, the Museum of Memory and Tolerance in Mexico City—and 
other areas with refugee resettlement and integration programs (such as Guadalajara and 
Saltillo). Ideally these exhibitions would be implemented around the same time in various 
regions of Mexico.  
● To complement these efforts, the Ministry of Culture, in partnership with private 
foundations or other donors, could provide grants for a series of public art exhibits—for 
example, at the entrances to Chapultepec Park in Mexico City—enabling the public to 
reflect on and interact with images of refugees in their home countries and/or in Mexico. 
● The Ministry of Culture should complement these strategies with a social media 
campaign, inviting the public to share stories about their experiences with refugees or 
how they have engaged with the public exhibits.  
  
Engage the public to respond with reflection, activism, and service. An influx of factual and 
sensory information about refugees may be overwhelming to individuals or lead to confusion 
about how to become involved. There are low-cost ways that the government or civil society 
groups could invite the public to reflect on what they have learned or to engage in activism or 
service to the refugee community, spreading a culture of acceptance, welcoming, and 
accompaniment. 
 
● Local cultural institutions, civil society groups, or media publications could launch a 
photo or essay contest aimed at refugees, Mexican citizens, or both that would focus on 
refugees’ stories, whether negative or hopeful. Ideally, the winning entries could be 
published nationally through a media outlet or as a part of public exhibit. 
● The Ministry of Education could develop and incorporate refugee awareness content, 
such as personal stories and case studies, in multicultural curriculum in public schools. 
This curriculum could be complemented with school field trips or volunteer days that 
allow students to engage with refugees and refugee services where possible, or with 
exhibits or information on refugees. Following these kinds of experiences, students 
should be invited to reflect through writing or group discussion. 
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Appendix I: 
 
Figure 21 
Refugee Status Application Process 
 
     Source: Resource of SEGOB, COMAR, UNHCR, National Commission on Human Rights; 
                     Accessed via Casa Monarca on April 13, 2019 
 
Appendix II: 
 
Figure 22 
Pending Refugee Status Cases by Delegation (As of January 31, 2019) 
 
Source: COMAR Data 
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Appendix III: 
 
Figure 23 
COMAR Organizational Chart (July 2017)159 
 
Source: COMAR 
 
Appendix IV: 
 
Figure 24 
Number of UNHCR-COMAR Agreement Positions by COMAR Office (October 2016)160 
Main Job 
Function 
Mexico City Chiapas Veracruz Tabasco Overall 
Assistance  2 2 1 2 7 
Protection 1 5 2 4 12 
Legal 2 1 1 1 5 
Administration 1 - - - 1 
Psychologic 1 1 1 1 4 
Total Jobs  7 9 5 8 29 
          Source: SEGOB, UNHCR Data 
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Appendix V: 
 
Figure 25 
Average Years of Work Experience for COMAR Employees (October 2018)161 
 
Source: COMAR Data 
 
Appendix VI: 
 
COMAR Budget Information and Methodology 162 
 
The reported data differentiates between “approved costs,” which are generally determined at the 
beginning of a fiscal year, and “modified” or “exercised costs,” which represent the amount of 
money actually spent on a particular program by the end of the year. This report uses the “modified 
costs” to determine COMAR’s spending on different categories.o Overall, COMAR’s budgetary 
descriptions did not include specific expenses. 
 
Each budget entry was assigned to one of six spending categories. 
  
Personnel: This category includes payments directly to COMAR employees. This includes base 
salaries, year-end bonuses, and vacation/holiday premiums pay. 
                                               
o These modified costs were often significantly different from the originally approved budget. 
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Government Programs: This category includes COMAR’s payments to other Mexican 
government institutions and programs. These payments were primarily related to social security, 
retirement, medical insurance, separation insurance, and other payments required by the federal 
government. 
  
Administrative: This category includes typical maintenance costs, including water, phone, and 
electricity. 
 
Transportation: This category includes COMAR employees’ flights for their job. It also includes 
“Services for the movement of people,” which likely involves moving refugee status applicants or 
employees by bus or car from one place to another. 
  
Services Provided: This category includes services for refugees and refugee status seekers. It 
includes “Services related to translations” and “Expenses related to cultural or sporting activities, 
and of extraordinary assistance.” 
 
Miscellaneous: This category includes items that did not clearly fit in any of the other categories, 
often because they were ambiguous and non-descriptive. For example: “Contracting of other 
services.” 
 
Figure 26 
COMAR Budget (2012-2018) 
Budget Category Range in Percentage of 
Budget (%) 
Average Percentage of 
Budget (%) 
Personnel 32.7 to 59.0 43.1 
Government Programs 7.9 to 21.7 11.9 
Administrative 5.6 to 25.9 12.7 
Miscellaneous 4.6 to 32.3 13.3 
Transportation 4.2 to 12.1 7.8 
Services Provided 1.6 to 35.0 11.2 
Source: COMAR Data 
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Figure 27 
COMAR Budget Breakdown 2012 
 
Source: COMAR Data 
 
Figure 28 
COMAR Budget Breakdown 2013 
 
Source: COMAR Data 
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Figure 29 
COMAR Budget Breakdown 2014 
 
Source: COMAR Data 
 
Figure 30 
COMAR Budget Breakdown 2015 
 
 
Source: COMAR Data 
  48 
Figure 31 
COMAR Budget Breakdown 2016 
 
 
Source: COMAR Data 
 
Figure 32 
COMAR Budget Breakdown 2017 
 
 
Source: COMAR Data 
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Figure 33 
COMAR Budget Breakdown 2018 
 
Source: COMAR Data 
 
Figure 34 
COMAR Approved Budget 2019 
 
Source: COMAR Data 
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Appendix VII: 
 
Figure 35 
Laws Relating to Refugees 
Type of right concerned 
Relevant law and Article(s) 
Brief Description 
Right to education 
Constitution of Mexico, Article III 
Refugees are entitled to free public education provided by 
the government  
Right to healthcare 
Constitution of Mexico, Article IV 
Refugees are entitled to receive protection for their health 
from the government 
Right to work 
Constitution of Mexico, Article V 
Refugees have the right to engage in the profession, 
industrial or commercial pursuit, or occupation of their 
choice  
Foreigners  
Constitution of Mexico, Article 33 
Foreigners are t entitled to the guarantees granted by Chapter 
I, Title I, of the present Constitution  
Non-refoulement 
Law of Refugees, Article 28 
Complementary protection prevents a foreigner from being 
returned to a country where his or her life would be 
threatened or where they face extreme danger. 
Non-refoulement 
Law of Refugees, Article 29 
Applicants denied refugee status will automatically be 
considered for complementary protection. 
Institutional Assistance 
Law of Migration, Article 71 
SEGOB will create groups to protect migrants in Mexico. It 
will collaborate with state, municipal, civil society, and 
private groups in the operation of migrant protection groups. 
Institutional Assistance 
Law of Migration, Article 72 
Federal, state, and municipal government will assist legally 
established civil society groups. 
Institutional Assistance 
Law of Refugees, Articles 54-57 
The government will consider social and cultural contexts to 
bring greater assistance to refugees, such as for adolescents, 
the elderly, those with disabilities, etc. 
Institutional Assistance 
Implementing Framework for Law of 
Refugees, Articles 67-73 
COMAR will conduct personal interviews to determine 
individual needs and will create and execute an assistance 
and integration plan for each refugee. 
Information and Confidentiality 
Law of Migration, Articles 13, 69 
Migratory authorities must inform detained migrants of their 
rights and freedoms, including to apply for asylum, and 
information about how their applications will be processed. 
Information and Confidentiality 
Law of Migration, Article 14 
INM will provide translation services for non-Spanish 
speakers. 
Information and Confidentiality 
Law of Migration, Article 28 
The PGR will ensure that refugees’ information remains 
confidential. 
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Legal Support and Due Process 
Law of Migration, Article 70 
All migrants are entitled to legal representation, and INM 
should make it easier for civil society groups to offer legal 
representation to migrants. 
Legal Support and Due Process 
Law of Migration, Article 11 
Migrants have the right to administration of justice and to 
due process. 
Legal Support and Due Process 
Law of Migration, Article 113 
Migrants who are victims to crimes in Mexico are entitled to 
having their crimes investigated. 
Legal Support and Due Process 
Law of Migration, Articles 109, 119, 122 
Migrants have the right to legal counsel while in detention 
facilities and during deportation and assisted return. 
Legal Support and Due Process 
Law of Migration, Article 140 
INM officials who fail to provide migrants with knowledge 
of their rights, or who delay or impede the regularization 
process will be sanctioned. 
Documentation and Regularization 
Law of Migration, Article 9 
Officials of the Bureau of Vital Statistics cannot deny to 
issue documentation on the basis of migratory status. 
Documentation and Regularization 
Law of Refugees, Article 44, Section V 
Refugees are entitled to receive an identification document 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as 
documentation proving permanent residency. 
Documentation and Regularization 
Law of Refugees, Article 57 
Mexican authorities must assist refugees in obtaining 
documentation through the consular services of their country 
of origin. 
Family Reunification 
Law of Refugees, Article 44, Section VI 
Refugees may request family reunification. 
Family Reunification 
Implementing Framework for Law of 
Refugees, Article 95 
Family members who enter Mexico through the family 
reunification process are legally considered refugees and 
receive permanent residency. 
Education 
Law of Migration, Article 8 
Migrants have right to access public and private education, 
independent of migratory status. 
Education 
Law of Refugees, Article 44, Section III 
The Mexican government must recognize previous studies 
and degrees earned by refugees, both those received in 
Mexico and abroad. 
Health Services 
Law of Migration, Article 8 
Migrants have right to receive public and private medical 
care. The Ministry of Health must provide free services to 
migrants in emergency situations, including in cases of 
severe illness or injury. 
Right to Work 
Law of Refugees, Article 44, Section IV 
Refugees have the right to work and the freedom to 
participate in all legal activities without punishment. 
Right to Work 
Law of Migration, Article 54 
Permanent residents may work in Mexico in exchange for 
remuneration, subject to an offer of employment. 
Sources: Mexican Constitution, Law of Refugees, Law of Migration 
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